Stock Market Simulation and Analysis by Iyer, Nandakumar Radhakrishnan & Callahan, Toby Michael
Worcester Polytechnic Institute
Digital WPI
Interactive Qualifying Projects (All Years) Interactive Qualifying Projects
July 2010
Stock Market Simulation and Analysis
Nandakumar Radhakrishnan Iyer
Worcester Polytechnic Institute
Toby Michael Callahan
Worcester Polytechnic Institute
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.wpi.edu/iqp-all
This Unrestricted is brought to you for free and open access by the Interactive Qualifying Projects at Digital WPI. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Interactive Qualifying Projects (All Years) by an authorized administrator of Digital WPI. For more information, please contact digitalwpi@wpi.edu.
Repository Citation
Iyer, N. R., & Callahan, T. M. (2010). Stock Market Simulation and Analysis. Retrieved from https://digitalcommons.wpi.edu/iqp-all/
112
 1 
 
Stock Market Simulation 
and Analysis 
DZT-1003 
 
An Interactive Qualifying Project Report 
Submitted to the Faculty of 
Worcester Polytechnic Institute 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the 
Degree of Bachelor of Science 
By 
 
Toby Callahan 
 
Nandakumar Iyer 
 
Date: July 6, 2010 
 
 
 
                       
Advisor:    
 Professor Dalin Tang 
 2 
 
Abstract 
Among numerous investment strategies in the stock market, this stock market simulation 
focused on the conservative strategy of John Bogle, which states that stock trading is a losing 
game and investment in index funds is a more profitable strategy.  The theory was tested by 
comparing the performance of an actively managed portfolio in an online simulator to index 
funds approximating the market. The outcome was a draw, with both active and passive 
strategies resulting in depreciation over a down market.   
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Chapter One: Introduction 
1.1: Goals and Overview 
The main goals of this project are to understand how the stock market operates and 
behaves, how to invest in the stock market, and to determine the best techniques to use in order 
to maximize earnings.  This will be accomplished by using an online stock market simulator in 
order to purchase stock and analyze how the prices fluctuate throughout a four week simulation 
period, with a focus on taking different positions by different methods. This ideally will yield an 
excellent diversity of experience in investing and finance.  
As an additional component of the project, we will be attempting to either prove or 
disprove the theory proposed by John Bogle, founder of The Vanguard Group, Inc., which states 
that trading in the stock market piecemeal is a losing game, and that the winning strategy is to 
buy a piece of the whole market (via index funds) and hold it forever. 
1.2: Brief History of the Stock Market in the United States 
Prior to the Revolutionary War (1775-1783), there was no stock exchange in the 
American colonies because money matters were controlled and handled in London due to British 
rule.  However, the result of the Revolutionary War was independence from British rule and now 
financial matters were the responsibility of the states.  Thus, one of the first stock exchanges in 
America was founded in 1790 in Philadelphia (known as the Philadelphia Stock Exchange).  The 
only shares that could be purchased were from the first three banks of the United States: Bank of 
North America (founded 1781), Bank of New York (founded 1784), and First Bank of the United 
States (founded 1791).  Due to the expenses of the war, all the profit from the shares sold was 
used to pay off the associated debt.  On May 17, 1792 in what would be come to known as the 
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Buttonwood Agreement, twenty-four stock brokers created the New York Stock & Exchange 
Board (which is known as the NYSE or New York Stock Exchange today).  The New York 
Stock Exchange has grown to become the largest stock exchange in the world today.  The other 
primary stock exchange in the United States today is NASDAQ, which stands for the National 
Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations.  It was founded in 1971 by the 
National Association of Securities Dealers.  NASDAQ was the first computerized stock market 
in the world and also was the first stock exchange to advertise to the public. Today, NASDAQ is 
the second largest stock exchange in the United States and is number one in the world for the 
number of trades that take place within the stock exchange.    
1.3: Definition of Stock and Shares 
Stocks are “a type of security that signifies ownership in a corporation and represents a 
claim on part of the corporation’s assets and earnings” (dictionary.com).  In the physical plane, a 
stock certificate is simply a contract, a notarized piece of paper corresponding to a stake in the 
company. There are at the very basic level two types of stock, “Common” stock and “Preferred” 
stock.  Common stock has two primary benefits: it can gain value and be sold for profit or it can 
be retained and the holder will receive quarterly (usually) dividends.  However, dividends are 
dependent on the company’s ability to receive or increase its earnings because dividends are 
dispensed using the company’s earnings.  Preferred stock differs from common stock in that 
although it doesn’t provide as much room for profit, it guarantees dividends.  In addition, holders 
of preferred stock are allowed to vote on company decisions and are also paid prior to holders of 
common stock.  These categories are not invariable or comprehensive, however, as the issuing 
company has some flexibility in what properties its stock issues have.  
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The amount of stock owned is quantified as shares.  The amount of shares one holds also 
determines their stake in a company (in other words, how much of the company they own).  For 
example, if a company has issued 1000 shares and an individual purchases 200 shares, he or she 
has a 20% stake in the company (owns 20%). A company can be either privately or publicly held 
(with great ramifications on how its management is regulated). The essential difference is that s 
publicly held company’s stocks are available for trade on the open market, whereas those of a 
privately held one are not. A private company can “go public” by conducting an Initial Public 
Offering, where shares are created and sold to the public. IPOs became a particularly prominent 
phenomenon during the Dot-Com bubble of 1995-2001, as covered later. The final fundamental 
stock behavior is a “split,” where a company decides to let each stock entitle the bearer to more 
shares, with a corresponding decline of the value of each.  
A company’s total valuation is determined by multiplying the number of shares available 
by the current market price per share. This is referred to as the company’s market capitalization.  
For example, if a company has 1000 shares available at a price of $10.00 per share, the company 
is valued by the market at $10,000. One important use for market capitalization is how the major 
indexes are weighted. The Standard and Poor’s 500 (S&P 500), for example, indexes the 500 
stocks weighted by greatest market capitalization, and uses that price as an (amazingly good) 
indicator of the performance of American industry as a whole. Notice that the word “value” is 
never used in the absolute sense here: the idea is that no asset has an intrinsic value independent 
of offers to pay for it. The valuation is what the market is willing to pay.  
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1.4: Influences on the Price of Stock 
If one could accurately predict where the price of stocks was headed, one could write his 
own ticket to a life of ease and luxury. Sadly (or perhaps consequently), this is a problem that 
math doctorate recipients routinely fail to solve, often spectacularly.  
Ideally, the share price would clearly reflect the value of the company and respond only 
to real changes in its well-being in real time, as determined by supply and demand, the basis of 
economics. Simply put, if the shares of a company are in high demand (because the company is 
doing well), the price per share would increase. Similarly, if there is a surplus of shares and little 
demand (due to poor performance), the price per share would decrease. The price itself would 
tend towards the amount that the assets of the company would be worth if disassembled minus 
the outstanding liabilities. This makes sense, as this is the definition of equity, and stocks are, 
after all, an equity security.  
In reality, since the market is comprised of human beings (albeit aided by some well-
programmed machines) volatility can be enhanced by other factors: to wit, if a major holder of a 
company’s stock decides to sell it off, other investors may wonder if some information 
asymmetry is being capitalized upon, and follow suit.  This mob action could cause further fear 
and further devaluation of a stock.  Conversely, if Warren Buffet decides a stock is a good 
investment, people can be trusted to follow along. It is clear then that investor confidence (and 
thus share price) is greatly influenced by word of events. These can be anything from the 
resignation of a trusted board member, a lawsuit against a manufacturer, or perhaps a massive 
industrial disaster. For example, over the past six weeks, BP’s (British Petroleum) shares have 
fallen 15% because of criticism over their lack of progress in the Gulf coast oil spill as well as 
their revelation that the total cost to date is over $990 million dollars. Company disclosures also 
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drive stocks. For example, if a company warns its shareholders that it will not meet earnings 
targets, the share price may fall. Notice that these factors can be psychological solely: there may 
have been no change whatsoever in the underlying company or its earnings.  One important 
measure to mention is that of Price/Earnings Ratio, which is market price of a share divided by 
earnings reported per share. P/E Ratio provides a good way to estimate the magnitude of 
speculation’s effect on a stock price: if the price rises faster than earnings, some of the gains may 
be due to the emotional factors mentioned earlier, an expression of “irrational exuberance” (to 
quote Alan Greenspan) rather than more concrete factors. P/E Ratio is also a very important 
measure in the Dividend Discount Model, which the author of our hypothesis uses extensively. 
P/E Ratio will be examined more closely later as part of our approach to stock selection. As a 
side note, investor confidence (or lack thereof) in a stock can be expressed in many ways other 
than the simple buying and selling of stocks. One important measure is the price of a Credit 
Default Swap. This will be later discussed with the other securities, and will later become 
important in discussion of the Gaussian Copula.  
1.5: Stock Purchasing Methods 
When it comes to purchase stock, there are two methods: through a brokerage and 
through a DRIP and/or DIP plan.  The use of a brokerage is a highly popular method by which to 
purchase stock.  There are two types of brokerages: full-service and discount.  Full-service 
brokerages provide market analysis and expert advice in addition to the brokerage service.  Thus, 
commissions are typically higher for full-service brokerages.  Discount brokerages on the other 
hand, do not provide any investment advice or market analysis and charge a lower commission.  
DRIP and DIP stand for dividend reinvestment plans and direct investment plans respectively.  
Both plans essentially allow companies to sell their own stock directly to investors for a low fee.  
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A DRIP provides the option of immediately reinvesting dividends back into the company, which 
means that the investor does not receive dividends.  The advantage of this is that there will be no 
brokerage fees or commissions to pay and the investor will not have to wait until he/she has the 
necessary funds to purchase additional shares.  A DIP is a more traditional system where an 
investor can purchase stock directly from the company, but will only be allowed to sell the stock 
on predetermined dates and times at a company calculated average market price.  One of the 
subtle aspects of stock purchasing is that one can often purchase stocks without putting down all 
of the cash up front. This is called “buying on margin,” in effect buying stocks with money 
borrowed from the broker, with other securities as collateral (typically other stocks in the 
portfolio). This collateral goes into separate margin account, which typically has some minimum 
value equal to a proportion of the investment made. If the value of the investment (read: the 
stock price) falls enough, the buyer receives a “margin call” requiring additional funds, or the 
margin account is liquidated. Margin buying allows exertion of leverage (proportion of debt to 
equity backing a position) increasing the consequences of subsequent changes. 
1.6 Derivatives  
The term “derivatives” encompasses an almost endless variety of contracts based on 
things that do not actually change hands at the time of the transaction. If I sign a contract to buy 
a stock later at a fixed price, no stock actually changes hands at the time of the signing. The 
contract itself is a derivative, specifically one based on stocks, and even more specifically a 
future. This is just one of a multitude of types of derivative; only major ones will be mentioned.  
1.6.1 Futures and Forwards 
Two different contracts of the “agree to buy or sell something later at a set price” nature 
are commonly sold: futures and forwards. There are several important differences between the 
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two, however. The first is that the text of a futures contract has been standardized to the extent 
that, like stocks, they can be traded on exchanges; they are fungible assets. In contrast, a forward 
is an “over the counter” product, something agreed to only by the two parties involved. As a 
consequence, the risk for a futures contract is diffused to the clearinghouse guaranteeing the sale, 
where the risk for a forward contract is entirely on the selling party. The futures market does not 
center on the actual exchange of goods (which tends to happen on the spot or cash markets 
instead), it is usually used to hedge against risk. Futures contracts are often closed out before 
maturity, rather than exchanging of the underlying asset (since they are usually used to bet on 
direction of asset price), while forward contracts (since they are more often used to hedge against 
volatility of asset price) are usually settled by exchange of assets or cash. A rancher could buy a 
corn forward to insure an economical supply of cattle feed at harvest time, for example. Another 
major difference is that the margin for a futures contract is re-calculated (typically every day), 
while a forward is not margined at all, with any change in value happening at exercise only. 
Forwards are inherently more risky for this reason, among others.  
1.6.2 Options 
In contrast to a future or forward contract in which the contract carries an obligation to 
purchase or sell later at a set price, a separate category of contract exists which carries a right to 
do so, but not an obligation. These contracts are known as options. The two major types give the 
right to buy at a fixed price (a call option) and sell at a fixed price (a put option). In the 
terminology of taking positions (on whether a stock will rise or fall), the investor “writing” a put 
(selling it) or buying a call is taking a short position, betting that the stock’s value will decline 
over the term of the contract. The investor writing a call or buying a put is taking the converse 
long position. Options contracts can either be exchange traded or OTC, with the same 
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consequences that followed for futures and forwards. Using options to take a position instead of 
buying or shorting the underlying stocks has the advantage of, for the same price, allowing one 
to leverage a higher number of underlying shares. Stock options are a fundamental part of 
executive payment packages, usually consisting of a call option, allowing the executive to buy 
stock at some low price in the future. This ties the option to company performance: the higher 
above the strike value the stock is, the more profit is made on the options. What a given option is 
worth before the strike date, however, is a non-trivial problem and requires some significant 
modeling assumptions and mathematical complexity. The major model used for this purpose is 
known as the Black-Schoals formula, which is a set of partial differential equations.   
1.6.3 Swaps 
Historically, the term “swap” referred a trade in bonds or stocks, exchanging cash flows. 
The purpose was to exchange the maturity of bonds, or the type of investment. The contract 
making the exchange is a swap contract. More recently, however, the variety of swapped assets 
has broadened quite a bit, including foreign currency and interest payments.  
1.7: Bonds 
Bonds are essentially loans given to companies and/or governments by an investor(s) that 
promise to repay the balance of the loan (termed face value) in a certain amount of time (termed 
maturation date) in addition to interest (termed coupon).  For example, if an investor buys a bond 
with a face value of $100, an annual interest rate of 10%, and a maturation period of 5 years, 
he/she will receive $10 a year for 10 years in addition to being repaid the initial balance of $1000 
at the end of the 10 year period.  Bonds are classified as debt securities because the bond owner 
purchases a debt and becomes a creditor.  This has its advantages over equity based securities 
such as stocks. The number one advantage is the lower risk associated with owning bonds 
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because they are fixed-income securities (the owner of the bond is aware of the final payout 
amount at the time of purchase).  Another advantage is that in the event that the issuing entity 
files for bankruptcy, bond owners will be paid prior to shareholders. Of course there is a 
compromise in owning bonds in that there is a lesser risk at the cost of lower returns.  
Bonds can be issued by local governments to pay for projects or raise money; these are 
called municipal bonds.  For example, a city could issue a bond to build a new bridge and pay 
the holders with tolls. Since the states have no power to tax federal spending and the converse 
applies, municipal bonds are often tax free at the federal level as a result. Many municipal bonds 
are in fact totally tax free. This of course is compensated for by a decrease in average interest 
rates. Municipal bonds also typically have a minimum investment in the thousands of dollars, 
which can limit their utility to small investors. As a side note, some funds exist that consist 
entirely of tax-free municipal bonds, allowing smaller investors greater utility with a safe and tax 
free income.  
1.8: Purchasing Bonds 
A key issue to consider when purchasing bonds is the risk as to whether or not the 
company will be able to stay out of bankruptcy, or will default on the debt.  The U.S. 
government has virtually no risk of defaulting on a bond; as the issuer of currency, it can just 
print more money to cover any bond it issues (with associated inflation). Municipal bonds 
HAVE defaulted in the past, but those individual incidents are historically significant: it happens 
exceedingly rarely.  
Investors love risk, as long as it's recognized and compensated for. A major kind of 
player in the global financial market attempts as its sole function to identify and label risk by 
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levels, facilitating trading and easy comparisons. Ratings cover all the ground between “high 
quality” and “already in default.” If these credit rating agencies gives a high enough rating 
(above BBB-, by S&P terms), securities can be referred to as "Investment Grade.” U.S. Treasury 
securities are generally considered to have a rating above AAA (on the S&P) scale, with a 
correspondingly superlative rating for the others; for reasons discussed above, they are 
considered “risk-free.”  Lower-rated bonds are relegated to "junk bond" or more optimistically, 
"high-yield bond” status. A person of significance for this topic is Michael Milken, who in the 
1980s and1980s recognized an untapped potential in junk bonds and almost singlehandedly 
developed the market for them, making surreal amounts of profit (sometimes 100% return on 
investment), and later ending up in jail for illegal practices.    
 
Table 1: Bond Ratings 
Although bonds are fixed-value assets, their price can fluctuate based on the current 
interest rates.  If the interest rate increases, the valuation of the bond decreases and vice versa.  
This can be beneficial to the bond owner.  In general, the bond owner’s objective is to maximize 
the yield.  Yield is a measure of the profit (accrued interest) that one makes as a result of cashing 
a bond.  For example, a $500 bond with a 10% coupon has a 10% yield ($50/$500).  However, a 
buyer tries to maximize the yield by getting the bond at a lower price (example: purchase a $500 
bond for $300 and the yield now becomes $50/$300 or 16.7%).  Similarly, if an investor already 
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owns a bond, he/she would like the price of the bond to increase over time since the interest rate 
is fixed (example: purchase a $500 bond for $500 with 10% coupon and at the end of the 
maturity period of 10 years, the price of the bond has increased to $750 due to interest rate 
fluctuation, final payout will be $500 in interest in addition to $750 for a total profit of $750 + 
$500 - $500 = $750).  Thus, we can see that bonds can offer much less risk than stocks with the 
potential of a reasonable return (although it still won’t be as high as that offered by investing in 
stock).  
1.9: Mutual Funds 
Mutual funds are essentially a collective investment in stocks, bonds, or other securities.  
The goal of any mutual fund is to minimize risk while providing the potential for large growth 
over extended periods of time.  Basically, a group of investors give their money to a fund 
manager, who is an expert financial analyst and can make informed decisions as to what kind of 
securities are best to invest in at the moment.  Mutual funds can have as many different strategies 
as an individual investor can, for example either focusing on a particular market segment or 
trying to follow a market index. Mutual funds can be actively managed, hunting for profit at the 
cost of turnover, or passively managed, trading as little as possible. There are three potential 
methods for profit.  The first is much like the dividends that are issued to share holders of a stock 
and interest that is earned by bond owners.  Annual payments of all dividends and/or interest 
accrued are issued to all investors in the mutual fund and this is known as a distribution.  The 
second method to earn profits is by selling any securities that have experienced growth.  These 
profits are also dispensed to all investors in the mutual fund as a distribution.  Finally, any unsold 
securities can be sold to another investor in the mutual fund for profit (provided that the price of 
the securities has increased).  The main advantages of a mutual fund include potentially reduced 
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risk through greater diversification than would be otherwise possible (funds are only way to, in 
effect, buy a fraction of a stock) and the ability to cash out (sell holdings and withdraw from the 
mutual fund) at any time.  Disadvantages include the difficulty of assessing the fund manager’s 
competence (as we’ll see later, past performance is not always a good gauge for future 
performance) and the expenses incurred by fund overhead (salary for the fund manager, for 
example).   
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Chapter 2: Investment Approaches 
2.1 Investment Tactics 
The complexity and variety of financial instruments described earlier has given rise to a 
great many strategies. A buyer of a stock might also write a call option. If the stock’s value rises 
above the exercise price of the call option, he can exercise it and claim a profit. If the stock’s 
value falls, some of the loss is covered by money received as a premium (the sale price) for 
writing the call. A major subset of investment strategies do this, attempt to reduce risk by 
compensating for it with other investments and this practice is called hedging.  Buying shares of 
Shoe Company A certain that Company A is well-managed and will make the best of the 
situation in its market, but then covering for the whole country perhaps wearing sandals instead 
by shorting Shoe Companies B and C to do so, is an example. As a matter of fact, with enough 
option plays, profiting from almost any predicted trend is possible. 
Another strategy is that of arbitrage, capitalizing on pricing inefficiencies. A company’s 
stock can be traded on more than one exchange with different prices. Given that both stock 
prices reflect the estimated value of the same company, the price should be the same. One can 
then bet that the prices will converge by shorting the higher and going long on the lower. 
Arbitrage is viewed as a low-risk means of obtaining small profits, a lot of leverage is needed to 
obtain significant return. One could also capitalize on the convergence of value on bonds of 
similar maturity, or perform similar tricks with the costs of option positions. The glut of 
information available in the digital age has reduced opportunities for these last significantly, as 
program trading decreases market response time. There are, however, entirely separate realms of 
strategy dictated by differing assumptions.  
 20 
 
2.1.1 Technical Analysis 
1. Mathematics is the language of nature.  
2. Everything around us can be represented and understood through numbers.  
3. If you graph these numbers, patterns emerge.  
Therefore: There are patterns everywhere in nature. 
- Darren Arnovsky (Pi) 
The “Dow” of Dow Jones Industrial Index fame laid foundations in a series of editorial 
reviews for a discipline called “technical analysis.”  The underlying assumption is that, with 
various mathematical rationalizations, the price and volume of a traded stock are enough 
information to predict where that stock’s price is moving by recognizing chart patterns. These 
predictions can then be capitalized upon with various options plays. One notable concept from 
technical analysis is that there are “support” and “resistance” lines that can be super-imposed on 
price behavior, where a stock price will rebound from either on its paths. Technical analysis has 
been criticized by the authorities whose opinions we have been following for our project.  
2.1.2 Fundamental Analysis 
Perhaps more convincingly to an engineering audience, the related discipline of 
fundamental analysis examines companies closely and attempts to determine if they are under or 
over-valued with respect to the market price.  It then bets according to the principle that 
eventually the market will find the correct price.  The data at hand is the financial statement of 
the company, those of its competitors, and information about the segment of the market in which 
it competes. One of Bogle’s main influences in founding the Vanguard 500 was the work of 
Burton Malkiel, who in “A Random Walk on Wall Street”, rejected the assumption of inefficient 
markets key to fundamental analysis. In further rebuttal of both cases, it has not been shown that 
adherence to either model carries better chances of success in the market.  
 21 
 
2.2 Lessons From The Past 
‘'Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it” - Life of Reason, 
Reason in Common Sense, Scribner's, 1905, page 284 
It would be foolish to jump into even a theoretical investment experiment without some 
knowledge of how the game has been played in the past, and as engineers, we are pre-occupied 
with preparing for the worst case scenarios. Nothing exposes underlying principles of a structure 
like a good disaster, and nothing influences future developments in law and policy more than 
attempted avoidance of same. With this in mind, undertaken here is a study of past disasters in 
hopes of learning applicable lessons.  
Furthermore, as individuals completely unversed in financial matters, deep curiosities 
about certain matters have been sparked over the years without means of answering them, until 
now. Why was the news in the year 2000 so uniformly bad? It sounded at the time like the whole 
economy was falling apart, when just before it had sounded like the stock market was basically a 
waterfall made of money just waiting for a bucket to be stuck into it. How did it become 
impossible for a young college student to get a loan for a new house? What are the chances that 
young college students are smart enough to “beat the market”? All of these questions will be 
answered. 
2.2.1 The Dot Com Bubble 
 Over Christmas break in 1994, two Cornell undergraduates were able to raise $15,000 
and invest in an Apple Internet Server. A few months later, on April 1 1995, theGlobe.com went 
live. It was a social networking site, one of many capitalizing on the rise of the internet changing 
communication paradigms. After just a month in action, the two had attracted 44,000 visitors [1]. 
In November 1998, the company went public, issuing 3.1 million shares. The day after the IPO, 
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the company’s market capitalization was $841.8 million, with shares trading at $94 [2]. By 
August 3, 2001, the shares traded below 25 cents. The company had never turned a profit [3].  
 This expression of market irrationality, an IPO going through the roof for a business with 
no profits, was utterly commonplace in the late 1990s. The heart of the optimism was found in 
the “network effect.” A service that allowed one person to make a page with their information on 
the web? That’s not worth much to say the least. The same service with one hundred million 
users, however, and analysts would predict, even in 2010, an IPO yielding a market 
capitalization in the mid to high double digit billions of dollars (Facebook) [4]. The appetite for 
this kind of business was boundless, with investors buying up stock for anything with a shiny 
new appearance. Companies could even 
add “.com” suffix to their name and see 
their stock price rise [5]. The business 
plan of each company being “get big fast” 
and figure out a way to make money off 
the user base later [6], the inevitable 
happened when many of them bombed soon after their IPOs. The result was the tech-heavy 
Nasdaq Composite losing 78% of its value (see above), and many of the dot-com “Siliconaires” 
rocketing right back into obscurity.  
2.2.2 Mortgage Backed Security Crisis, Credit Crunch 
It would be hard to overstate the impact of the subprime mortgage crisis on the U.S. 
economy and the lives of the American people. Unemployment has all but doubled and anxiety 
over the "credit crunch" has fueled endless debate on the news (and endless problems for those 
of us attempting to finance an independent life). The phenomenon's notability, however, does not 
Figure 1: NASDAQ Index (Into The Weeds 
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alone merit the inclusion of an analysis of these events into the documentation of a stock market 
simulation. As will be shown, the subprime mortgage crisis illustrates many fundamental 
attributes of some major players in the market and demonstrates the power and peril of some 
very new and exciting financial instruments.  
While not illustrative of stock market concepts, some discussion of the root assets 
underlying the drama to follow is needed. With real estate values on an uninterrupted rise from 
2002 on, there was great incentive for consumers to buy a house under any circumstances 
possible and benefit from the rise. Subprime adjustable rate mortgages were pitched as the ideal 
way for consumers with questionable credit history to do so. The most common were either 2/28 
or 3/27 ARMs, with either a two or three year (respectively) flat rate period, after which the rate 
would float based on some index and some margin specific to the mortgage for the remainder. 
The intent was that customers with iffy credit would use the flat rate period to repair their credit 
by making the low payments, and then refinance the home with a prime mortgage using the 
increase in equity due to the rising market before the rate adjusted and the payments skyrocketed 
[7]. The housing crisis came about because the bubble burst and that equity was not available. 
Equity, of course is the balance of the market valuation of the asset with its liabilities. If market 
valuation drops and the liability (the mortgage) is the same, it's possible to end up with negative 
equity. This leads to late or defaulted payments, and eventually foreclosure. This left many 
subprime consumers in an ugly situation by 2007, when the crisis began in earnest as the market 
froze. As the crisis continued, even prime mortgage holders had problems as their homes lost 
equity as prices fell.     
It has been adequately explained how subprime mortgages can become toxic assets. The 
question remains of "How did the losses incurred by subprime mortgage defaults spread 
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throughout the economy?" The answer lies within mortgage-backed securities. It has long been 
practice to lump several mortgages together (all fixed income assets) as a security. The problem 
has long been pricing them properly. The factors influencing default are myriad making for a 
very complicated modeling problem. For some time, then, the only mortgage-backed securities 
traded were ones deemed riskless by association with the federal government via Fannie Mae or 
Freddie Mac. The breakthrough that allowed the massive amount of later trading came in 2000 
with David X. Li's development of the Gaussian Copula[8], which allowed mortgage backed 
securities to be priced (along with countless other financial instruments) by using Credit Default 
Swap prices to model correlation of variables. The models utilizing the Gaussian Copula banked 
on the CDS market prices reflecting risk accurately. Credit Default Swaps, incidentally, are a 
kind of "bet" that some other asset will default. This may invite comparison to insurance, but 
neither party in the CDS has to have any interest in the subject of the bet: akin to buying fire 
insurance on your neighbor's house, with all the moral hazard it entails. This innovation allowed 
the creation of securities pooling diverse elements together with a very simple expression of the 
risk involved.  
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The most significant novel financial instruments relevant to this discussion are called 
Collateralized Debt 
Obligations, or CDOs. This 
type of security organizes the 
mortgages into several tranches 
that constitute a capital 
structure with some senior and 
some subordinated. The higher 
tranches' holders would get paid first in the event of default. Note that for a bank, securitizing a 
group of mortgages increases liquidity: the bank has cash in hand from selling the securities to 
invest in more real estate. CDO issuance absolutely SKYROCKETED with the housing bubble 
(see graph left), reaching a peak in 2006. Even more importantly, many of these newly issued 
CDOs were in fact CDO2s, or CDO3s. That's right, a CDO backed by CDOs backed by CDOs 
backed by subprime mortgages. Many traders and institutions could not be asked to check down 
through the many layers of financial abstraction to see that the mortgages beneath were bad 
assets. With the boom in CDO issuance, many portfolios were thoroughly exposed to the 
subprime crisis without awareness of the problem.   
When it came time to get ratings agencies to evaluate these new securities so they could 
be sold, senior tranches could be rated much higher than ones representing subordinated debt, 
even though they were all backed by the same mortgages or securities. The problem was 
compounded by the abstraction of CDOns: a security could be an amalgamation of AAA rated 
amalgamations of bad mortgages. Billions of dollars have been gained and lost on the merit of 
Figure 2 CDO Issuance 1997-2007 Q1 
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ratings changes, security ratings are very serious business. Why, then, were these tainted CDOs 
traded as AAA? It represented a massive failure to recognize risk! To put it another way, "about 
90 per cent of the products rated as investment grade by Moody’s in 2007, for example, have 
since been relegated to junk status. By 2007, the housing boom was already gone. The smart 
money had seen the mess coming two years ago [9]. How could they be that wrong? The answer 
lies within incentives: everyone from bank to investment group to investor was making a lot of 
money, and no individual party wanted to incur the wrath of the rest by being the one to sound 
the alarm. A credit rating agency collects fees from the creator of the security. A credit rating 
agency that downgraded its rating of assets held by its major business partners would provoke 
hostility and lose business. Thus, warnings were ignored.  
Several important lessons can be gleaned from this exercise. First of all, one must 
acknowledge the inevitability of Black Swan Events, a term was created by Nassim Nicholas 
Taleb and expanded upon in his book "The Black Swan." For recorded history, all swans were 
known to be white in European society, and it was taken as an absolute truth. This is analogous 
to how the implementation of the Gaussian Copula looked at only CDS prices from the time that 
CDSs had existed: the last 10 years [8], and within that realm it allowed a great approximation of 
what appeared to be very little risk. To continue the analogy, explorers in 18th century Australia 
found Cygnus atratus, the black swan, shattering the notion of a white swan planet. This 
discovery is akin to the real estate bubble's ending and cataclysmic consequences.  
A second lesson involves mathematical models: the results of even a brilliantly 
constructed model are worse than useless without a complete understanding of the operation of 
the model and its underlying assumptions. The crisis happened because fund managers could 
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take the risk values from the quantitative analyst's models and make decisions without 
understanding anything about the model.  
The final lesson is that all parties involved in any transaction act only in their best 
interest. A ratings agency has motives for rating the way it does, and taking a rating at face value 
and letting that be the sum of the investigation is a mistake. 
2.2.3 Long Term Capital Management 
"There are two kinds of people who lose money: those who know nothing and those who 
know everything," - Henry Kaufman 
As previously discussed with regard to CDOs, pricing derivatives is not easy. It was a 
great leap forward for economics as a science in 1973 when Robert Merton, working on a model 
proposed by Fischer Black and Merton Schoals, published an (arguably) novel model for pricing 
options. For this, Merton and Schoals later received the 1997 Nobel Prize in Economics (Black 
was not eligible, as he had passed away). It is safe to say, then, that Long Term Capital 
management had some high-caliber minds on its Board of Directors. A hedge fund formed in 
1994 by John Meriwether, a former head of bond trading at Salomon Brothers [10], the fund had 
over a billion dollars in starting capital. Their game was arbitrage: capitalizing on changes in 
relations between different securities. The value of a 29-year T-bill and a 30-year T-bill should 
eventually converge, so LTCM shorted the lower-yield bond and went long on the other, using 
massive leverage to turn a profit on a tiny margin. A wide variety of bets went badly, and after 
two years of 40%-plus annual profits, LTCM lost billions of dollars on very short order and had 
to be bailed out to avoid causing a liquidity crisis for the whole market. 
We've seen, through analyzing past crises and failures, how very smart people can 
manage to lose a lot of money very easily. If Nobel laureates in economics running a hedge fund 
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with all the resources in the world can wipe out their investors "playing the market," what hope 
does any average man have of doing so successfully? The sane and sober answer is: "not much." 
2.3 Lessons 
One might suggest entrusting one's money to smarter men, men investing as a full time 
job. The typical choice would be a mutual fund, where investments can be spread to diversify 
much farther than an individual could, as a diverse portfolio is universally held to be good 
investing practice. Unfortunately, fees within the mutual fund industry have been the subject of 
Supreme Court cases (e.g. Jones v. Harris Associates) as rational minds have attempted to rein 
them in. The case most recently ruled on revealed that one mutual fund would charge as much as 
twice as high a fee to individual consumers as corporate pension fund partners for the exact same 
services. The average mutual fund turns over its portfolio entirely every year (Bogle 36), and the 
expenses (even without fees) associated with this are not trivial.  In fact, the overall cost of 
equity fund ownership can be 3-3.5%/yr: the expense ratio is about 1.5%/yr, adding 0.5-1%/yr 
for sales charges and portfolio turnover up to 1%/yr. 
Even more disappointingly, many academic papers have been publishing showing that 
mutual funds do not "beat the market," and that those that DO often fall behind soon after.  
According to Davin Swensen, the CIO of the Yale Univ. Endowment Fund, "a miniscule 4 
percent of funds produce market-beating after-
tax results with a scant 0.6% annual margin of 
gain."(Bogle 33) Of the tiny portion of funds 
that beat the market, they on average do so only 
barely! Figure 3: "Winners, Losers, and Failures:
Long-term Returns of Mutual funds, 1970-
2005" 
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As the graph at left shows, (Bogle 79) the odds of picking a mutual fund that outperforms the 
market are very long indeed. The largest bin by far is mutual funds that went out of business, and 
only TWO outperformed the market by more than 4%, out of three hundred and fifty five funds! 
Michael Mauboussin calculates odds of fund outperforming 15-year market at 1 in 223,000. For 
21 years? 1 in 31,000,000!  
A further complicating factor weighing in against mutual funds in terms of one’s ability 
to select a good one is that past evidence has shown overwhelmingly that one’s first instincts are 
often wrong. Before the dot-com crunch, only about 20% of investments went into “aggressive” 
equity mutual funds. These funds are actively managed and attempt to hunt profits… 
aggressively. Aggressive equity mutual fund investment made up 95% of inflow in 1999-2000, 
when the bubble burst! (Bogle 55). People tend to jump into a particular fund at the worst 
possible times. The lesson is that strategies that have been working great (aggressive funds pre-
bubble burst) often do far worse than strategies that merely do well (index mutual funds) when 
things change. Looking at the five largest of these funds, 21%/yr was made from 1996-2000. 
This was well above the S&P 500’s return of 18.4%/yr, clearly beating the market. With the 
bubble bursting ’01-‘05, the aggressive funds all went negative while the index fund made less 
than 1%/yr. Averaged out, it came to about 7.8%/yr for aggressive equity mutual, 9.1%/yr for 
index. Sounds okay, right? Well, the fund may have done okay, but thanks to capital inflow 
diminishing the per-dollar return, the average shareholder lost 0.5%/yr. Average index 
shareholder? They made 7.1%/yr. Compound the fund return over the whole period from 1996-
2005, the index fund returns 112%. The aggressive mutual fund returns 4.5%.   
What, then, about acting as an individual and working with a conventional brokerage 
house? A broker only makes money when a financial product is sold, and the size of 
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commissions often depend on deals made on the part of the brokerage. This, simply put, is a 
moral hazard. The broker's incentives do not necessarily align with that of the investor. Even 
legally, brokers "are now only required to steer their clients to “suitable” products — based on a 
customer’s financial situation, goals and stomach for risk." [11] Although today's media covers a 
swing towards re-branding brokers as "advisers" that must meet separate legal standards, the 
hazard remains. The adviser might not have an ulterior motive in selling the client a specific 
stock, but the fact remains that the adviser has an incentive to perform actions, to buy or sell. 
One doesn't need an adviser to remind them to hold onto their assets. 
Let's assume for the moment that adviser is honestly acting in the best interests of the 
investor. In July 1993, the New York Times began a series where five advisors were given 
$50,000 imaginary dollars to invest over twenty years. In 2000, the best-performing advisor had 
about $105,000. The average was about $88,000. An index tracking the S&P 500 would have 
earned $138,000. Okay, perhaps these particular advisers were just poor performers. In a study of 
26 years of advisor newsletters, 25 of which were in circulation in 1980, only 13 were still in 
business in 1996. Only three had outperformed the market by any margin. Of the other 22, only 
two were ahead when they left the market. (Bogle 111) 
John C. Bogle made history in 1975 by creating the First Index Investment Trust. It was 
the first ever index fund, using minimal management to approximate market as a whole as 
closely as possible. It is, of course, impossible to own proportional shares in every last company 
in the whole market, it would be an enterprise of unending complication. An index fund instead 
uses various financial instruments to keep up. Futures contracts based on the major indexes (such 
as the S&P 500 or Dow) are a major tool, as their value directly reflects the performance of the 
index, which very closely follows the performance of the economy as a whole (the S&P 500, 
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from 1931 to 2006 has had 98% correlation with the total market [12]). Why follow the economy 
as a whole? Simply put, the hypothesis is that stock price fluctuations are not truly predictable 
and playing the stock market is a losing game.  Investors as a whole cannot outperform the 
market, for every gain by one investor 
SOMEONE has to lose. Factor in the fees and 
overhead from trading actively, and you have a 
losing game. The core value of the economy is 
not ethereal. It is a steadily growing quantity 
representing productive industry, with stock 
market expectations being a mess of stochastic noise obscuring it. From the perspective of 
investment value growth, the Great Depression was a mere blip! (Bogle 11) 
Why do people ignore the obvious? Why talk of "star investors" beating the market and 
making millions when it is clearly a game of chance? More specific insight comes from Nassim 
Nicholas Taleb who, in "Fooled by Randomness," imparted one of the most important 
realizations relevant to the strategy pursued here. If investors that "blow up" by making a bad bet 
and losing a lot of their own or other people's money (as a broker or money manager) drop out of 
the business (due to lack of funds if it was an individual, or getting fired and becoming 
unhireable as an agent) and are thus never heard from again, then it is merely the process of 
elimination that gives us successful active investors. To paraphrase a story from Taleb, if 
investing was a sheer matter of chance (which we’ve argued here persuasively) modeled as a 
coin toss with a potential gain or loss of $10,000 ten thousand investors after ten years would 
yield almost ten people who had never lost a bet by chance alone. Someone has to win, but it 
doesn’t mean that a winning record is indicative of anything other than randomness. The stars 
Figure 4: Investment Return versus Market Growth
- Growth of $1, 1900-2005 
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here are only people that haven't yet blown up! This plays right into the human mind's inherent 
optimism. We as investors (with hearts set on achieving success) ignore failures and idolize 
successes, even if the difference is only probabilistic. No one wants to look at their string of 
lucky guesses and see it clearly: it feels a lot better to be a "star investor" than a lucky idiot.  
To understand such a probabilistic system, one must think in terms of the underlying 
randomness and accept it. The Black-Schoals model for options pricing incorporates an 
assumption of Brownian motion on the part of stock price and there is good reason to believe 
that this is a good approximation: price trends on a fine enough scale are truly random. Taleb 
mentions a ground-breaking paper by Robert Shiller in which it is mathematically derived that 
stock prices are entirely too volatile to be based on some tangible manifestation of value. It goes 
without saying, then, that if one were to track even a good investment very closely, one will see a 
fair amount of loss along with the gain. Across a whole year, the stock may gain, but follow it 
closely enough, and you’ll see losses. Up close, one sees only the volatility, not the trend, and 
humans are not adjusted for this. Psychologically each loss about feels about twice as bad as 
each gain feels good. These losses can goad people into making rash decisions. As Warren 
Buffet said, "The greatest enemies of the equity investor are expenses and emotions." 
Taleb lists several ways that one can be a “fool of randomness.” Each of these represents 
a denial of the possibility that randomness will intrude violently (Taleb 79).  
1. Committing to a position to excess – As Taleb says, “loyalty to ideas is 
not a good thing for … anyone”  
2. Tendency to switch from being an investor and holding things long-term 
while losing to being a trader and changing positions rapidly when 
winning.  
3. No plan for the worst-case scenario  
4. Absence of reflection in the face of losses 
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5. Denial that losses are a result of methods 
2.4 Our Approach 
So, based on the hypothesis, we are going to test John Bogle’s theory regarding short 
term investments being a losing game.  In order to accomplish this, we are going to select 
companies to purchase stock in (simulated of course), and trade actively in them with the goal of 
maximizing profits.  At the end of the four week simulation period, we are going to examine the 
performance of our portfolio to determine how well it supports or refutes Bogle’s ideas by 
comparing them to the return of an index fund over the same period, and analyzing the costs 
incurred by active trading.  Our simulation will be conducted using the online investment 
website simulator called Investopedia (owned by Forbes Digital).  We will be starting with 
$100,000 in simulated funds. Before achieving a level of comfort with financial reporting and 
analysis, Ford Motor Company, Apple, Google, Inc., and BP PLC were chosen as initial 
investments.  
2.4.1 Rationalizations 
Ford Motor Company was chosen because they have experienced overall growth since 
the government bailout controversy that befell the domestic automakers in the first half of 2009.  
Ford was the only company that did not request government aid to avoid filing for Chapter 11 
Bankruptcy.  General Motors and Chrysler Corporation on the other hand, did request 
government aid.  Therefore investor approval and confidence in Ford has increased and along 
with the increasing reliability scores that Ford has received, we feel that there is a lot of potential 
for further growth.  Finally, Ford has just recently released the highly anticipated 2011 Ford 
Mustang GT 5.0 and early reports suggest that these vehicles are flying off the lots.  So, it is 
evident that Ford’s stock prices will continue to increase for the foreseeable future. 
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Figure 5: Ford Stock Prices, Sep. ’08 – May ‘10 
 
 Apple, Inc. was selected because their products generally set the standard for 
consumer electronics, especially ease of use and innovativeness.  A perfect example of this is the 
new Apple iPad, which was released only a couple of months ago, but has already redefined in 
home entertainment.  Also, Apple tends to release new products during the spring and summer 
months, so share prices climb as a result.  One of the major reasons why we have selected to 
invest in Apple is because there are rumors circulating that the next generation iPhone will be 
released in June.  Considering the way the first generation device has transformed mobile 
productivity, entertainment, and communication, we are anticipating that share prices will soar 
when the latest device is released. 
 
Figure 6: Apple Stock Prices, July ’09 – May ‘10 
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Google, Inc. has not been doing well lately as evidenced by their falling share prices.  
However, past performance would seem to suggest that they will recover, especially with 
updates to their Android mobile operating system.  Also, Google is a highly ambitious firm as we 
saw when it purchased the popular video site YouTube for $1.65 billion.  Overall, we feel that 
now is a good time to purchase a significant number of Google shares since they are selling at a 
lower rate than in the past.  We are hoping that Google’s innovative software and web 
technologies will result in a significant increase in share prices in the near future. 
 
Figure 7: Google Stock Prices, July ’09 – May ‘10 
 
The final company that we have decided to invest in is BP (stands for British Petroleum).  
Although BP’s share prices have fallen astronomically in the past few weeks due to their failed 
efforts in the Gulf coast oil spill disaster, we feel that efforts to fix the problem are progressing.  
We are in agreement that the best option is to purchase $10,000 in BP shares while they cheap 
and then hope for a resurgence in share prices once the demand for crude oil prompts renewed 
confidence in BP. 
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Figure 8: BP Stock Prices, Last Three Months 
Company Amount to be Invested 
Ford Motor Company $30,000 
Apple, Inc. $30,000 
Google, Inc. $30,000 
BP, PLC $10,000 
Table 2: Fund allocation 
2.4.2 Criteria to Evaluate Stocks 
In the wake of this decision, more serious thought was given to our ability to “see into” a 
stock and assess its performance. Criteria had to be selected to evaluate our past choices and 
guide future ones. In reading, several major criteria popped out:  
1. Market Capitalization 
2. Evidence of Long Term Trends 
3. P/E Ratio 
4. PEG Ratio 
5. Profit Margin 
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In modern portfolio theory, a concept exists called “the efficient frontier.” The idea is that 
there is a clear relationship between price and volatility (conceived of as risk), and that the 
efficient values form a curve (maximal price for volatility). On the low end are such investments 
as Government bonds that have low risk and low rewards. At the very high end, one has small-
cap stocks and corporate bonds. As beginning investors, large-cap stocks (often defined as 
greater than $9 billion dollars) were a logical place to start. They represent the shallow end of the 
stock investment pool, which might help us avoid going too far underwater.  
A further criterion that would seem useful on its face is “what has this company’s stock 
been doing for the last six months or so?” It would seem to be a reasonable period of time to look 
at, considering that further back may have been with different management or under different 
circumstances, and sooner may not be enough to see any slow-moving trends. A look six months 
into the past could provide some insight into what was happening, if one was mimicking the 
behavior of a typical investor (of course, both Bogle-heads and followers of Hume know that 
past performance is no guarantee whatsoever of future performance). 
As mentioned in Section 1.4, stock valuation, P/E Ratio is one of the important numbers 
attached to a company’s stock market performance. To reiterate, it was stated that it is the ratio 
of the Price per share over the reported Earnings per share, and can be thought of as a measure 
of the influence of speculation on stock price. It allows investors to compare companies of 
different size and in different market sectors on a level playing field, providing a simple relative 
measure of how “cheap” or “expensive” they are with regard to their earnings. In reading, the 
standard we came across calls 15 to 25 a decent valuation. Lower P/E values can indicate an 
under-priced stock (and a potential bargain), higher ones can indicate a stock that is over-priced, 
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and a possible hazard. This will be one criterion for our stock picks, but not one cast in stone on 
the lower end. We are after buying opportunities and good values, after all.  
The PEG ratio is the ratio of the P/E ratio to the annual earnings per share growth (the 
time-derivative of the Earnings mentioned earlier). It adds some information to knowledge of the 
P/E Ratio as it accounts for expectations of growth. This is a two-edged sword, of course, 
because predicting the future (as shown in earlier sections) is risky business. The lower the PEG 
ratio, the higher the expected growth relative to the company’s current valuation is.  It is worth 
repeating that the PEG ratio is based on projected growth in earnings, and is a markedly less 
concrete measure than the previous two.  
The profit margin is quite simply the ratio of the net profits to the revenue from sales.  
For example, if a company makes a profit of $1000 from revenue of $10000, their profit margin 
is 10%. This measure in essence represents a company’s ability to control costs. If the company 
is increasing its earnings rapidly but with a declining profit margin, it is clear that costs are not 
being managed as well as possible during the period of growth.  
2.4.3 Evaluation of Choices 
Company 
Capitalization 
(in billions USD) 
Positive Trend
 (over last 6 months) 
P/E Ratio PEG Ratio Profit Margin
Ford Motor  35.02 Yes 6.59 .40 4.96% 
Apple, Inc. 224.75 Yes 15.19 1.02 21.15% 
Google, Inc. 139.04 No 13.70 .93 28.30% 
BP, PLC 91.91 No 4.20 1.00 7.57% 
Table 3: Selection criteria, selected four stocks 
Viewed through the lens of our new criteria, how did our gut instincts treat us?  
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The Ford Motor Company falls a bit short of the “large-cap” label, which might mean it 
is a bit more volatile than it would likely be if it was larger, but P/E Ratios suggest a possible 
under-valuation, and the PEG ratio is the lowest of all. It is tough to compare Ford’s profit 
margins to its close American competitors, as General Motors is now privately held, as is about 
80% of Chrysler. Toyota’s margin is about 0.7%, which is encouraging news.  
Apple might be almost as well off by these standards. Massively capitalized, it should be 
a slow moving target, and if its positive trend continues, a profitable one. The P/E ratio shows 
the possibility of slight under-valuation, but the PEG ratio shows signs of slowing growth. 
Google is very similar in a lot of ways, and not just in terms of market sector, but with what 
appears to be a slightly greater predicted growth rate and higher profit margin.  
BP is probably the most troubling of the stock picks on these numbers alone. The 
stagnant PEG ratio and signs of rock bottom P/E are not particularly good signs. It is possible 
that the P/E Ratio represents undervaluation and a good buy, but this carries with it strongly 
pessimistic market opinion. Instinctively these things are reflected in the lesser investment in BP 
versus the others.   
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Chapter 3: Simulation Results 
3.1 Week 1 Data: 
Week 1 initially seemed like it was going to be highly unsuccessful because we lost 
nearly 4% of our account value (almost $4000) in a span of one day.  However, by the end of the 
week not only had we recuperated the deficit, but we had also made a profit of about $270.  
Needless to say, this was a very promising and confidence inspiring result.  The following table 
shows our portfolio, which includes the company, symbol, share purchase price, share closing 
price (at the end of trading on Friday, 6/11/10), total value of the shares (number of shares x 
current share price), the percentage change in value, and the net gain/loss:  
 
Table 4: Portfolio information for Week 1 (6/7/10-6/11/10) 
 
As can be seen in the above table, BP was the only stock that took a loss over the course 
of the week.  We had anticipated this because BP is receiving heavy criticism from both the U.S. 
government as well as the local population in the Gulf coast over their lack of effort and success 
in remedying the oil spill there.  In fact, BP’s share prices were actually lower (around $32) 
during the first half of the week, but picked up almost $2 by the end of the week.  
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News for BP, of course, was not positive. On Wednesday, the United States Department 
of Justice announced it was considering legal action to halt payment of dividends to BP 
shareholders in the wake of the disaster. This is perhaps worse news for BP’s standing in the 
British stock market than ours, as “BP dividends accounted for some 12 percent of all dividends 
handed out by British companies last year” [12] . On a somewhat positive note, it was announced 
in Thursday June 10th by Susan Daker and James Herron   Of Dow Jones Newswires that BP had 
reached a daily containment of 15,800 barrels a day. It is not much in proportion to the 
“estimates from the first round of study varied from 12,000 to 25,000 barrels a day,” but it is at 
least progress.  
Our expectation is that BP share prices will continue to fall, but once progress is made in 
the Gulf and consumer confidence is restored, share prices should increase, yielding a substantial 
profit for us.  Ford seemed to be the only consistent stock and posted daily profits with the 
exception of one day (Wednesday).  Ford also posted the greatest profit for the first week, with a 
gain of $703.  However, we are not expecting to make large profits because the share prices are 
cheap and there is no reason for them to increase significantly in the near future (no new Ford 
products are supposed to be released within the next month and monthly sales have remained 
relatively constant).  In fact, Ford’s only significant news mentions were an enthusiastic speech 
by Chief Executive Alan Mulally explaining Ford’s strong position regardless of the end of the 
Mercury brand and a Ford pace car being debuted at the nearby Michigan International 
Speedway for the first time in 41 years.  
The Apple and Google stocks were very unpredictable throughout the week. Some bad 
press had Apple’s name in the spotlight during the week, which may be part of the explanation. 
On Wednesday June 9th, AT&T revealed that a security breach had exposed iPad user’s private 
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information. Gawker carried word that intruders had successfully “obtained the e-mail addresses 
of top level politicians, television reporters and business executives, including White House chief 
of staff Rahm Emanuel,” as noted by Cecilia Chang an article for the Washington Post [13], 
which went on to say that ”14,000 e-mail addresses were exposed for iPad 3G users,” also 
according to Gawker. “The issue has escalated to the highest levels of the company and was 
corrected by Tuesday; and we have essentially turned off the feature that provided the e-mail 
addresses” read a statement by AT&T on the same day. It is possible that the public perceives the 
problem to be with AT&T, whose cell phone service has been widely complained about by 
Apple customers. The exploit itself seemed trivial: a script publicly available on AT&T’s 
website would return email address when prompted with ICC IDs.  
CNet picked up a story just one day later that the Federal Trade Commission might be 
preparing to investigate Apple for anti-trust issues related to a story that broke on Monday, June 
7th [14]. In November, 2009, Google purchased a subsidiary company called AdMob, having 
outbid Apple and engendered much ill will [15]. Six months of FTC review and 750 million 
dollars later, the acquisition was complete [16]. On Monday, however, Apple changed its terms 
of service in a way that made AdMob unable to convey information about how Google ads on 
the iPhone were clicked, making the acquisition much less valuable [17].  To quote Erica Ogg, 
writing for CNet: “It would appear Apple is blocking a major competitor from its platform, but 
while still allowing plenty of other, smaller ad networks to play.” At the time of stock market 
closing on Friday, there was no word from the FTC or the Department of Justice, but a fair 
amount of anxiety.  
A troubling issue on the back burner is that of Foxconn, a Chinese Apple hardware 
supplier who has been embarrassed by a series of suicides at its factory and a subsequent halt to 
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paying of death benefits in its wake. Protestors picketed outside of a Hong Kong annual meeting 
on Tuesday, June 8th [18]. The amount of blowback experienced by Apple, protestors or not, is 
probably insignificant.  Earlier in the week Apple introduced the newest version of Safari, Safari 
5, promising faster and more secure browsing, with a highlight being HTML 5 support. Initial 
response is positive, but again, perhaps insignificant [19]. 
With the exception of the ongoing Apple versus Google slugfest over mobile devices 
supremacy, a major news item for Google was continued investigation into possible violation of 
privacy laws. “Google said May 14 that its Street View vehicles had inadvertently collected data 
over unsecured Wi-Fi networks” [20], and on Wednesday June 9th, New Zealand was added to 
the long list of countries beginning legal investigations.  
Perhaps as a result of the above information (Google being denied the utility of its 
expensive acquisition and Apple’s legion of troubles), both stocks dipped simultaneously on 
Wednesday. However, by the end of the week, both stocks had appreciated to the point where we 
made a small profit (about $72).  For the coming week, we are expecting that both Apple 
(especially Apple because the iPhone 4 and iOS4 have been officially announced) and Google 
will yield better results than the first week. From the performance of this week, it seems that 
regulatory troubles are for both are expected but not a reason for a precipitous decline in stock 
price. Further developments in this vein may not affect price much.  
The following table and accompanying graph show the price fluctuations and value of the 
portfolio throughout this past week (6/7/10 – 6/11/10).  As can be seen, the portfolio lost about 
4% of its overall value before recovering by the end of the week, a significant underperforming 
of the market. Compared to a fund tracking the index, it is in especially poor shape. Playing the 
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role of typical investors, the holders of this portfolio would probably be contemplating drastic 
action.  
 
Table 5: Portfolio value throughout Week 1 (6/7/10 – 6/11/10) 
 
Figure 9: Graph of portfolio value vs. S&P 500 index value throughout Week 1 (6/7/10 – 6/11/10) 
3.2 Week 2 Data: 
 Week 2 was a great week for us because as the table below shows, our portfolio 
made over 11 times the profit that it did at the end of trading last week.  Overall, our portfolio 
has now appreciated $2984.54 or almost 3% of our original investment of $99806.86.  We made 
an additional profit of $162.24 with our shares in Ford Motor Company, which is 23% greater 
than our profit at the end of last week.  To date, our total profit from our shares in Ford Motor 
Company is $865.28.  But it was Apple that took the cake for this week by showing a 
tremendous growth of $2479.25 over our initial investment of $30,135.56 (our Apple shares are 
now collectively valued at $32,614.81).   
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Apple is now beginning to perform exactly as hoped.  So far, Apple shares have 
appreciated 8.23% from the beginning of the experiment and we hope that as the new iPhone is 
actually released to the public and consumer feedback begins to circulate, that we will see even 
greater gains. There was plenty of mention in the media of anticipation for the new version of the 
iPhone, and plenty of hype for it versus Google’s Droid. Not all news coverage was positive for 
Apple, however. Continuing security fears after the data breech at AT&T were stoked when 
Goatse security researchers complained about an exploit of Safari they revealed in March that 
had still not been patched [21]. Also troubling is the presumed spread of Mac-based malware, as 
indicated by Apple’s unannounced addition of more malware signatures to Snow Leopard [22].  
Due to the fact that BP share prices continued to fall (as expected) this past week, the net 
value of our BP shares fell by approximately another $600.  So far, we have lost a total of 
$1102.97 or 11.36% from our initial investment of $9709.93 (shares now valued at a total of 
$8606.96).  The outlook was further worsened by Standard and Poor’s reduction on Thursday of 
BP’s credit rating by another two notches, to “A.” [23] An “A” rating is still five notches above 
“junk” status, however, and is termed “upper medium grade.” This change was mirrored by the 
other ratings agencies. One of the cited reasons for the downgrade is that BP put aside 20 billion 
dollars in assets for a claims fund which was cited elsewhere in the Wall Street Journal as a 
reason for the energy sector doing a bit better that day. 
Again, this was not unexpected and fear of loss was part of the reason why we chose to 
invest only 10% of our total available funds in BP. This is an illustration that close monitoring of 
long-held positions is probably unwise, because it would be no different now if BP does actually 
recover later. There was encouraging news in the past week, however, in that the CEO of BP, 
Tony Hayward was replaced as director of operations of the Gulf oil spill disaster by BP 
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Managing Director Robert Dudley.  This might be just what BP needs in order to make progress 
on rectifying the mess in the Gulf.  In this vein, BP was able to increase the amount of oil 
captured to 25,000 barrels to day (up from a reported 16,000 last week) [24]. Progress on the oil 
spill disaster would most certainly result in the rise of BP share prices eventually and we are 
hopeful that we will at least break even by the end of the simulation period.  A further chunk of 
bad news fell on Wednesday, however, when estimates of oil leaking were raised to 35,000 to 
60,000 barrels per day, up from 20,000 to 40,000 barrels per day last week [25], further 
emphasizing the long road ahead.  
There was a lot of good news for Ford this week, corresponding to the stock’s great 
performance. The Ford luxury-hybrid MKZ was certified by the Environmental Protection 
Agency at 41 miles per gallon city and 36 miles per gallon highway, making it one of the most 
fuel-efficient vehicles on the market [26]. Meanwhile, in Missouri, Governor Jay Nixon plans to 
announce Friday that he’ll call a special session of state legislature to work on tax incentives for 
Ford there [27]. The icing on the cake was that Ford made the top five for J.D. Power and 
Associates Initial Quality rankings for the first time in the 24 year history of the survey [28].  
Finally, the total profit for our Google shares thus far is $742.98, which is a 2.5% gain on 
our initial investment of $29,758.85 (total value of shares is now $30,501.83).  We feel that the 
main reason for the increase in share prices is the rumor that Google will be releasing an update 
or entirely new version of their popular Android mobile operating system (direct competitor to 
iOS4 by Apple).  In a further development in the ongoing battle, Google intends to release a 
music service as a competitor to iTunes over the summer. It will probably not be smooth going, 
as Google rivals have not been kind to it in its attempts to break into new markets.  When Lala 
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and iLike worked with Google to deliver music, both were soon acquired (by Apple and 
Myspace, respectively) and shut down [29].   
 
Table 6: Portfolio information for Week 2 (6/14/10-6/18/10) 
The following table and graph show the overall growth of the portfolio since its creation.  
The total appreciation is 2.99% and as the graph shows, our portfolio’s growth plot demonstrates 
a positive trend.  This would seem to suggest that the market will continue to appreciate for the 
foreseeable future.  The growth plot will be especially useful in determining if the market has 
peaked and we have already seen the greatest gains.  In the real world, any signs of peaking 
would be the time to sell any high risk stocks that one owned. 
 
Table 7:  Portfolio value throughout Week 2 (6/14/10 – 6/18/10) 
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Figure 10: Graph of portfolio value vs. S&P 500 index value at the end of Week 2 (6/14/10-6/18/10) 
3.3: Week 3 Data 
This week yielded tremendously disappointing results as far as our stock portfolio was 
concerned.  Our portfolio’s value went from a total gain of $2984.54 to a total loss of $2765.70, 
meaning that our initial investment of just under $100,000 is now worth approximately $97,000.  
Literally, each of our four stocks posted a significant loss and Apple was the only stock to still be 
worth more than what we had originally purchased the shares for.   
 
Table 8: Portfolio information for Week 3 (6/21/10-6/25/10) 
It was expected that Apple would continue to do well, with the release of the new iPhone 
(despite widely covered antennae problems) and continued good sales of the iPad. What possibly 
could have caused such a terrible week for the rest of our portfolio? A judge sided with Google 
and YouTube throwing out Viacom’s billion dollar lawsuit and Verizon and Google introduced 
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the Droid X, a phone to compete with the iPhone 4. While the CEO of Ford Europe projected a 
weak second quarter [30], Ford had plenty of news to buoy it: investment in a plant in Thailand, 
the governor of Missouri predicting passage of tax benefits, upgrades to the Mustang, and the 
release of the Ford fiesta. If stock prices moved on news alone, that would seem to be enough. 
Why Google and Ford did not perform well this week is not apparent.  
BP suffered a setback when a Remotely Operated Vehicle crashed into the collection 
hood, but was able to recover quickly to the previous rate of oil capture [31], but the real villain 
in the dire fall in price was apparently related to fears that BP might have to issue additional 
shares to cover cleanup costs. News that BP had paid $2.35 billion in cleanup so far also exerted 
a downward pull on stock prices, as did news of an incoming tropical storm [32]. The bond 
market reflected a fear of short-term default risk by exhibiting higher yield of bonds maturing 
sooner, an inversion of the usual relationship 
 The following graph and accompanying table show our overall portfolio value over the 
course of the simulation.  It seems as though the portfolio’s value peaked between June 15th and 
June 22nd, which is why, in accordance with Taleb’s principles, we are re-evaluating our 
positions and resorting to different techniques in order to limit the damage to the overall value of 
the portfolio. If the investment simulator we are using would allow it, now might be exactly the 
time when a typical investor might consider buying on margin. A typical investor might want to 
make up lost ground by making a larger bet. In particular, we wish we could apply some 
leverage to our short bet on BP, because it seems like a fantastic one. 
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Figure 11: Portfolio Value vs. S&P 500 Index Over Week 3 (6/21/10 – 6/25/10) 
 
 
Table 9: Portfolio value throughout Week 3 (6/21/10 – 6/25/10) 
 
3.3.1 Short Selling 
Since our current portfolio is obviously not having much success, we are going to resort 
to alternative tactics.  First and foremost, we are going to use BP’s continuing fall to our 
advantage by short selling the stock.  Short selling is a practice where the investor orders a set 
number of shares of a stock sold by their broker.  The broker sells these shares and deposits the 
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funds from the sale in the investor’s account.  The catch is that the broker is only lending the 
shares to the investor and requires that the investor purchase the same number of shares of the 
same stock and returns them to the broker at a later date.  The advantage of this method is that if 
the share prices plunge after the funds have been deposited in the investor’s account, he/she can 
purchase the same number of shares for less money in order to “cover” the short sell, resulting in 
a profit.  For example, suppose 100 shares of BP are sold by the broker for $10/share and the sale 
amount of $1000 is transferred to the investor’s account.  Shortly thereafter, BP’s share prices 
fall to $5/share, so the investor purchases 100 shares of BP at a price of $500 and covers the 
short sell by returning the shares to the broker.  Thus, the investor has made a profit of $500 
($1000 deposited - $500 cover).  Conversely, short selling also poses the risk of losing money if 
the share prices increase after the short sell has taken place.  Using the same scenario as above, if 
BP’s share prices increase to $20/share, then the investor loses $1000 ($1000 deposited - $2000 
cover) if he/she decides to cover at that moment.  It is difficult to decide when to cover because 
the share prices may continue to rise, meaning greater losses if the investor waits or the share 
prices may fall dramatically soon after, meaning that the investor unnecessarily loses money if 
he/she covers too early.  Furthermore, share prices have no limit as far as the highest price they 
can attain goes, whereas they can only depreciate to $0.  What this means is that the maximum 
profit that an investor can make through short selling is 100% while there is no limit to how 
much he/she can lose.  Finally, the stock market is designed around the fundamental principle 
that stock will appreciate, so by short selling, you are essentially betting against the entire 
market and its operational principles.  Thus, not only are you undertaking a greater risk, but you 
are also frowned upon by fellow investors who feel that you are cheating the system by betting 
against the success of the market and driving the stock price down.  Nevertheless, when done 
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properly, short-selling offers the potential of great rewards and considering the abysmal 
performance of our portfolio thus far, we feel that employing this technique might salvage our 
investment. .  The following table summarizes this week’s short sell of BP stock ($5000 worth of 
shares): 
 
Table 10: BP Short Sell Data for Week 3 (6/21/10-6/25/10) 
 
So, we cautiously used the short selling approach this week by ordering $5,000 worth of 
BP shares and as expected, share prices fell even further meaning that if we were to cover the 
stock we would have made $422.40.  The reason why we didn’t cover the stock is because we 
are certain that we can net a greater profit by allowing BP’s share prices to fall even further 
before we cover.   
3.3.2 Hedging on Apple 
Similarly, we are going to take a small short position on Apple stock in the coming week, 
which seems ludicrous.  However, the reason for this decision is that Apple’s new iPhone 4 has 
been reported to have many issues (expected since this is a brand-new model that will have some 
teething problems).  We fully expect Apple’s share prices to fall in the coming week due to the 
widespread reports of problems.  Since Apple has a reputation for quickly rectifying such issues, 
we are planning on using options to predict that Apple stock will fall on the very short term (by 
July 2nd) whereas we are going to short sell an additional $15,000 worth of BP stock taking a 
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comparatively more long term position short position. In contrast to the BP short sale, where 
potential loss is theoretically unlimited (BP’s shares could climb quite a lot), the options 
maneuver allows us to have a limited risk. We can lose, at most, the premium. This is a good 
thing, because predicting Apples fall seems a lot more contingent than BP’s, and falls into the 
category of a hedge. We aim to guard against loss in value of our Apple holdings by predicting 
and profiting from the dip, and compensating for any loss in value. More sophisticated investors 
would have worked out the predicted trends before and hedged perfectly to compensate for 
potential losses. 
As mentioned above, one can take a bearish position on a stock by either selling a call 
option or buying a put option. The investment simulator we are using does not allow one to write 
options, so we had to buy a long put. The put market at the time of planning our purchase 
allowed for July 2nd and July 17th as the soonest dates of expiration.  A wide variety of strike 
prices is available, with a correspondingly wide variety of premiums. With a put option, a higher 
strike price means a higher premium. In ignorance of option pricing, we decided to purchase 
about $2500 worth of put options with a premium of $24.05 each and a strike price of $290. This 
turned out to be just one option, controlling 100 shares of the underlying security.  
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3.3.3 Losing Google, New Ventures 
As it stands now, we have lost $2710.15 or in other words, 2.72% of our original investment of 
$99726.90.  In addition to the short selling technique, we are looking to sell our Google shares. 
Given that Google is engaged in a fight to the death with one of our other investments, having 
money in both seems like a failure of diversification, as the fortunes of the two companies are 
linked. A gain on Apple’s side, because of a new smart-phone perhaps, will probably also entail 
a loss on Google’s side due to projected loss of market share; they are not truly independent. 
Over the last month, their performance has been mirrored.  
Given the lackluster performance of other more conventional stock picks and the short 
time left for the simulation, riskier investments are needed. A booming and volatile industry is 
ideal, ideally one not yet the domain of established interests. Small-to-midcap biotechnology fits 
the bill exactly [33]. As seen in the graph below, money is pouring into biotech. Even more 
ideally, it is estimated by InvestBio that only about 40 analysts in Wall Street firms cover this 
segment of the biotech market.  
Figure 12: Google vs. Apple, Percent Change in Value, Mar. 29 - June 25 
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Small biotechnology companies can have promising drug therapies, but require the funding 
necessary to continue research and development on 
these therapies. In this sense, biotech startups are 
following steps similar to many other startups: there is 
an initial capitalization through an IPO, a period of 
varying burn rate without profit while developing the 
drug, and eventual entrance into profitability after it is 
cleared for human use by the U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration after medical trials. Wise investment in 
these early on could yield good returns.  
It’s worth noting how closely biotech investments depend upon actions of the FDA and 
the results of medical trials. This avenue of information is absolutely essential to investing well. 
We are actively scanning websites such as biospace.com (biotech news) to seek out and identify 
potential short term investment candidates. As with any other “hot industry” there are plenty of 
sites and newsletters out there offering “great tips” for a fee.  
3.3.4 Biotechnology Firm Selections 
After extensive research, we have identified four potential candidates that could show 
significant growth in the coming week.  These companies are Gilead Sciences, Inc., Roche 
Holdings, Vertex Pharmaceuticals, Inc., and Regulus Therapeutics, Inc.  All of these companies 
have either bought out a competitor, been acquired by a competitor, or have drug protocols that 
have yielded promising results in the past week. 
Figure 13: Biotechnology Market 
Capitalization, 1994-2005 
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The criteria for selection have changed drastically. A slow-moving large cap stock is no 
longer ideal for short-term returns. Further, much less information is available. Many of these 
companies are joint ventures between publicly traded companies, so the numbers we have been 
relying upon do not apply. The fundamental difference is that the intended scale of investment is 
shorter. We are only concerned with companies that could have a large windfall in the next two 
weeks. Long term performance is no longer a predictor; we are looking for immediate term 
benefits.  With that in mind, the research focused on current events.  
Gilead Sciences is headquartered in Foster City, California with operations in North 
America, Europe, and Australia.  They just recently (6/25/10) signed an agreement with CGI 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., finalizing a $120 million dollar buy out of the latter.  One of the few 
companies under consideration that is not a joint venture; our measurements are available: 
Company 
Capitalization 
(in billions USD) 
Positive 
Trend 
 (over last 6 months) 
P/E 
Ratio  
PEG 
Ratio 
Profit 
Margin 
Gilead Sciences 
Inc. 
31.03 Yes 11.18 0.72 N/A 
Table 11: Table showing investment criteria as applicable to Gilead Sciences, Inc. 
The picture that emerges is one of a solid long-term investment. This would have been a 
good buy by our original standards. It remains to be seen if this is still true under new criteria. 
Gilead’s Executive Vice President, Research and Development, and Chief Scientific 
Officer Norbert W. Bischofberger released the statement: “The acquisition of CGI represents a 
unique opportunity to expand our research efforts in an interesting and promising area of drug 
discovery.  CGI has established itself in the area of protein kinase biology and small molecule 
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discovery, and the company’s scientific leadership and expertise represents a strong strategic fit 
with Gilead’s existing research organization. We look forward to advancing compounds in CGI’s 
portfolio toward clinical development.” [34] 
However, we have decided not to purchase Gilead stock because it seems that they are 
also downsizing, which is a troubling sign.  In a report by the Triangle Business Journal, “Gilead 
Sciences (Nasdaq: GILD) will close its Durham office by year’s end in a move affecting 150 
workers, as the Foster City, Calif-based bio-sciences company consolidates in anti-viral research 
and development efforts.” [35]  
Genentech, Inc. had been operating for nearly 30 years when it was acquired in 2009 by 
Roche Holdings.  It specializes in the discovery, testing, and manufacture of drugs that are used 
to treat serious or life-threatening ailments.  The latest drug under the Genentech brand has been 
Lucentis®, has recently been approved by the FDA in order to treat the effects of Retinal Vein 
Occlusion (RVO).   
RVO is essentially the loss of blood flow to the retinal vein and results in the swelling 
and hemorrhaging of the retina, which can result in permanent loss of vision.  The condition 
affects over 1 million people in the United States alone.  Lucentis had tremendous success during 
clinical trials: “In wet AMD clinical trials, Lucentis administered monthly demonstrated an 
improvement in vision of three lines or more on the study eye chart in up to 41 percent of 
patients at two years. Nearly all patients (90 percent) in those trials treated monthly with 
Lucentis maintained vision.” [36] 
We have decided to invest in Roche because of the overwhelming success of its drug in 
clinical trials and the recent approval by the FDA.  Gaining approval of the FDA and releasing a 
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drug to market is no easy feat, so we are quite confident that Roche will increase in value during 
the coming week. 
Vertex Pharmaceuticals, Inc. is a biotechnology company located in Cambridge, 
Massachusetts.  Its research focuses on finding small molecule drugs to treat viral diseases, 
inflammation, autoimmune diseases, cancer, pain, and bacterial infection.  One of Vertex’s key 
discoveries (in conjunction with GlaxoSmithKline) was the HIV protease inhibitor, Lexiva. 
Vertex has been developing a drug to treat Hepatitis C called Telaprevir®.  According to 
a news report on 5/26/10 by Reuters, “A hepatitis C treatment being developed by Vertex 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. led to a 75 percent cure rate in a pivotal trial of previously untreated 
patients, the company said on Tuesday.” [37] Hepatitis C is a viral infection of the liver that is 
transmitted through blood contact such as contaminated needles.  It can result in liver failure, 
liver cancer, and even death.  Hepatitis C has infected upwards of 270 million people (equivalent 
to the population of the United States) throughout the world. 
Considering the impact that Vertex’s drug, Telaprevir®, could have on the millions of 
people suffering from Hepatitis C, it is our feeling that they “have a winner” so to speak.  A 75% 
cure rate is nothing short of remarkable and is sure to cause Vertex’s company to increase in 
value. 
Regulus Therapeutics, Inc. is a joint venture of Alnylam Pharmaceuticals of Cambridge, 
Massachusetts and Isis Pharmaceuticals of Carlsbad, California that specializes in the 
development of drugs that are based on microRNAs. Their research and development focuses on 
Hepatitis C, cardiovascular disease, fibrosis, oncology (cancer), immuno-inflammatory diseases, 
and metabolic diseases.   
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On June 22, 2010, Regulus officially partnered with Sanofi-Aventis, a globally 
recognized pharmaceutical company: “Regulus Therapeutics Inc. and Sanofi-Aventis 
(EURONEXT: SAN and NYSE: SNY) announced today that they have entered into a global, 
strategic alliance to discover, develop, and commercialize microRNA therapeutics. The alliance 
represents the largest microRNA partnership formed to date, valued at potentially over $750 
million, and includes a $25 million upfront fee, a $10 million future equity investment subject to 
mutual agreement on company valuation, and annual research support for three years with the 
option to extend two additional years. The alliance will initially focus on the therapeutic area of 
fibrosis. Regulus and Sanofi-Aventis will collaborate on up to four microRNA targets, including 
Regulus’ lead fibrosis program targeting microRNA-21. Sanofi-Aventis also receives an option 
for a broader technology alliance that provides Regulus certain rights to participate in 
development and commercialization of resulting products. If exercised, this three-year option is 
worth an additional $50 million to Regulus.” [38]  
Although the partnership between Regulus and Sanofi-Aventis is a significant 
development with a high potential for growth, we are looking to generate good-sized profits 
within the next 7-10 days and a newfound partnership is not likely to give us this result.  Had we 
been seeking to invest in the long term, investing in Regulus would most certainly have been a 
wise decision. To do so, we would have had to invest in the two firms that have stakes in it, with 
an inherent diversification.  
In conclusion, we will be selling our Google shares and evenly investing the funds from 
this transaction between Genentech, Inc. and Vertex Pharmaceuticals, Inc.  We are both of the 
impression that this should yield much better results than Google did over the past 3 weeks and 
look forward to seeing our investment grow. These investments are incrementally more risky 
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than those made at first. Where the first round of purchases pursued “large-cap but growing” in 
established industries, these two investments are “mid-cap and volatile” in a booming industry. 
This profound shift has been dictated by time and emotion; a failing portfolio and a set time limit 
prompt drastic action.  
 3.4: Week 4 Data 
The performance of our portfolio in Week Four was somewhat of a disaster. We at least 
had the solace of knowing that many other investors shared our pain. “U.S. Stocks Drop as Dow 
Posts Longest Losing Streak Since 2008,” read a headline from Bloomberg BusinessWeek on 
July 3rd.  As can be seen in the following table, our final portfolio value is $93,196.26 or exactly 
4% lower than our initial investment.  
 
Table 12: Portfolio value throughout Week 4 (6/28/10 – 7/2/10) 
 
Needless to say, this was quite disappointing as we had high hopes that our 
biotechnology stocks and ExxonMobil would be quite profitable this week. Major news for BP 
was the rumors of acquisition of some of its assets by various buyers.  One widely circulated 
report starting the rumor machine was JP Morgan analyst Fred Lucas’ estimation that BP was 
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62% undervalued, concluding that “the market has lost sight of the intrinsic value that is resident 
in an asset-rich company like BP” [39]. This supports the original idea behind the BP purchase 
that the stock was undervalued, and had hit bottom. Unfortunately, given the amount of time 
remaining, the portfolio would probably not see this acquisition happen. Mergers and 
acquisitions take time, and the term is almost over. With that in mind, all interest in BP (bearish 
or bullish) has been discarded. The short option lost value on news of the rumors, but could 
plunge further down on any news from the cleanup (such as BP’s response to its having been 
burning endangered sea turtles alive [40]). In short, predicting the value of BP’s stock in the 
short term is a loser’s game for our portfolio.  We have thus sold the BP stock and bought 
Exxon, in hopes of seeing some short term gain. Goldman had rated Exxon at a price target of 
around $65 on the 28th of June. Disappointment followed as Exxon instead fell to $56.57. 
Ford has not been performing well for this portfolio, but better times may be ahead. Alan 
Mulally issued a statement that it was reducing its debt by $4 billion, which has been interpreted 
by Wall Street Journal analysts as “a sign the auto maker remains confident in its own 
turnaround despite a softening car market in the U.S.,” which placed the stock on it’s Hot Stock 
List on June 30th.  In less encouraging news, the tax package projected to go through in Missouri 
has been trapped “in legislative limbo, imperiling its chances for passage” [41].  
Financial bloggers had given reason to hope for the performance of the biotechnology 
investments made. The volume of call options can be a benchmark for improvement, and the 
options volume of Vertex was trading about 7 times higher in volume than the daily average, 
signaling traders forecasting a rise in stock price [42]. Technical analysts had rated Vertex highly 
only a few days earlier, on June 30th, when the stock was listed as one of the top five in the 
Healthcare sector by the “Relative Performance” index [43]. Roche Holding entered an 
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agreement with IBM on July 1st to develop a novel DNA sequencing technology [44], a British 
healthcare watchdog recommended that Roche’s arthritis drug be covered by the NHS [45], and 
second stage studies supported Avastin for increasing survival of ovarian cancer [46]. These 
positive developments did not affect stock price as hoped, however, with further losses over the 
week.  
3.4.1: The Apple Hedge 
As mentioned earlier, we went long on a put option for Apple on a hunch that the 
backlash from the antenna issue would become worse and negatively impact Apple’s stock. 
Other issues also became apparent, first of which a “frequent fail[ure]” of the proximity sensor in 
the phone that is supposed to detect the user’s face and disable the touch pad [47]. Also 
distressing for holders of Apple stock, an issue surfaced last week with a yellowing of the 
display screens. Apparently, a bonding agent used on the screens might have not been given 
enough time to cure properly, causing yellowing [48]. The issue seems less severe than it could 
have been, however, as the compound eventually does cure and the yellowing issue disappears. 
The issue has been framed as a byproduct of the massive demand for iPhones necessitating a 
quickened manufacturing process.  
The option hedge played last week paid off very well, with two major caveats. One being 
that it was not calculated to precisely hedge our bets, the other being that there was some 
potential profit that wasn’t made on account of the timing of the sale. The option was purchased 
at noon on June 28th, controlling 100 shares of AAPL (less than our holding of 119 shares), at a 
price of $2,346.74. The underlying stock, AAPL, was trading at $267.73.  The intrinsic value of 
the option, therefore (the difference between its strike price of $290 and Apple stock’s $267.73) 
was about $2,227. The stock would have to fall another $1.20 for the option to break even, and 
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any further falling would be profit. The option was sold at 3pm on the 30th, when the option was 
worth $3,363.26, and the underlying stock was trading at 255.16. We realized a profit then, of 
$1016.52, a 43% return on investment. Our shares in the underlying stock, however, had lost 
$1495.83.  We see then, that this was not a full hedge. The fall in price from the stock 
outweighed the gains made on the option. If the stock had risen instead, the total loss would have 
been limited to the $2,346.74 premium invested, and the profits from our investment in Apple 
would have outweighed it handily. In short, the way we hedged reflected (unconsciously) a 
feeling that Apple had a greater chance of rising than falling. The decision to sell at the moment 
we did, too, was driven by this notion as well. It was felt that Apple’s depressed value could not 
be maintained with a new product on the market, and it was feared the option would eventually 
lose value. We are, after all, long on Apple.   
This may have been a mistake, as Apple’s stock (along with the stock of pretty much 
everything else) has continued to fall. The reasons given by different analysts for this recent 
downturn are legion, from the doomsday predictions of Elliot Wave theorist Robert Prechter 
(who predicts an epic downturn and a massive depression) to the more conventional “fear of a 
double dip recession” confidence quavers of more mainstream analysts.  
3.4.2: Missing the Tesla IPO Boat 
The Tesla Motor Company has long been on the radar of any aspiring mechanical 
engineering student. An electric car that does zero to sixty in 3.9 seconds is a very conspicuous 
entry in the sports car market, and gorgeous styling doesn’t hurt. The company going public 
provided a great opportunity to have these interests intersect. The initial offering price was only 
$17. Unfortunately, while we were aware of the IPO on Tuesday, shares were only purchased for 
$25.79 at 10am on Wednesday, and sold later that same day at 3pm for $25.82 realizing the boat 
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had been missed. The value peaked at $30.18 less than an hour and a half after purchase. 
Massive profits could have been realized with earlier action, but massive losses could have 
resulted with a slower realization that the stock was over-valued for the entirety of Wednesday. 
A further opportunity came with the stock settling into what is presumably a true value: if a good 
guess for TSLA’s eventual value could have been made in time, a potential short sell, short put, 
or long call could have been made to capitalize on its reversion to that value. It is possible that 
the reversion was so sudden because of realizations on the part of investors that Tesla hasn’t 
turned a profit since its beginnings in 2003, and that its $109,000 sole product might not weather 
economic recession well.  
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 14: First Days of Tesla IPO and Actions 
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Chapter 4: Results 
During the four week period, we made buy and sell transactions totaling $362,439.20.  
This is an astounding figure. Over 28 days, the turnover was approximately 362%. When 
projected over the course of a year by calculating daily turnover and multiplying by 265, the 
figure becomes 4724.65%. Clearly this portfolio represents a hyper-active trading style, dwarfing 
the average equity mutual fund turnover (100%) by a factor of 47. Expenses due to commissions, 
perhaps counter intuitively, were quite low in comparison to portfolio value. The commissions 
on this massive amount of trading only ate up about 0.33% of our starting capital. Remembering 
Bogle’s rule of thumb that 100% turnover eats 1%, our expenses have been astoundingly low.  
 
Table 13: Table of transaction history of the full four week simulation period 
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With the exception of the virtual break-even of Tesla, every single regular stock 
transaction became a loss (totaling $7,544.02). BP and Ford made up 56.3% of all money lost to 
normal stock trades, despite being only 39.8% of the initial portfolio. The sole glimmers of hope 
were special transactions. The 5.7% returned on short-selling BP brought a 5.7% return as shown 
above, which did a lot to offset its stock’s terrible performance, representing a “short term drop, 
long term rise” bet that paid off to some degree.  The Apple hedge more than offset any losses 
from the decline in Apple’s value, but there is no reason to believe that the dive that Apple’s 
stock price took had anything to do with the iPhone problems whose existence we predicted. It 
seems much more likely that Apple dived for whatever reasons the entire market did. The utility 
of options in hedging was demonstrated, but a lesson about the unpredictability of the markets 
was taught as well.  
After examining a graph of the overall performance of our portfolio, it looks as though 
our portfolio’s value peaked at 2.9% on June 18. Thus, it would have been a wise decision to sell 
our holdings at that point because we would have made almost a $3000 profit.  Unfortunately, 
our decision to wait and let the market play out was a costly one.  One could take away from this 
experience that investing in the stock market over the short term, it is best to buy/sell small and 
earn small rather than buying large amounts of stock, holding on to them for a long period of 
time, and then ultimately watching them lose quite a large percentage of their value. Conversely, 
it is also possible to take from this that the human tendency while watching stocks is to sell them 
on the downtick, which is precisely contrary to one’s financial interest. Finally, over the period 
of the investment simulation, the S&P500’s value fell by 3.97%. Our portfolio fell by 8.03% by 
comparison, lagging the market significantly. Annualized return for our portfolio would be -
63.4%, a dismal result by any measure.  
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Figure 15: Portfolio value vs. S&P 500 index value throughout entire simulation with peak  
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Chapter 5: Conclusions & Discussion 
5.1 Diversification 
But divide your investments among many places, 
for you do not know what risks might lie ahead. 
- Ecclesiastes 11:2 (NLT) 
In the rush to understand the investing world well enough to pick some stocks, some key 
conventional wisdom on portfolio construction was under-appreciated. Specifically, we have 
reason to believe our portfolio was under-diversified to some degree. With the phenomenal 
turnover rate, we might have possessed a wide variety of stocks at one time or another, but 
holdings at any given time were restricted to only five or six stocks. Part of this was a bias 
towards smaller decisions on the basis of insufficient time to research many options, but even 
arbitrary purchases of stocks on the major indices might have helped us reduce the volatility 
shown by our returns. Studies have shown that the difference in standard deviation of returns 
between one stock and a portfolio of ten is a factor of two. However, the reduction in returns 
variability between the four to six stocks we had and the perhaps twenty we could have ginned 
up would not have been anything close to that. The same study places a four stock portfolio at 
27% standard yearly deviation and a twenty stock portfolio at 22%. Clearly, the benefits of 
diversification further than we had put together wasn’t the sole cause of our failure.   
5.2 Conclusion 
If this portfolio were intended to stand in for an actively managed equity mutual fund, 
there would be points of wide divergence from the intended attributes. To begin with, turnover as 
experienced here would be much smaller. The turnover in our portfolio is more representative of 
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an insanely active individual investor. Another divergence would be the expenses experienced. A 
fund would have had employee salaries to pay among other overhead. Even so, our fund might 
not have been totally inapplicable to the hypothesis.  
It is clear that this particular actively managed portfolio performed poorly. The question 
remains as to what this says about active management in general, and specifically what it says 
with regards to the hypothesis of the experiment overall. This might have just been a bad time to 
try this experiment. If both the index equity mutual funds and the rest get shelled, there’s no 
support or refutation of the hypothesis. 
Only a handful of mutual funds finished this quarter with any profit at all, index or not, 
and those that did posted miserable gains. Three cited by a recent MarketWatch article as good 
examples of that small group are Monteagle Informed Investor Growth, +2.7%, Stadion 
Managed Portfolio Fund, +0.5%, and Wasatch Heritage Value Fund +0.2%. Large-cap stock 
funds fell 12% on average, mid-cap by 9.7%, and small-cap by 9.1% [49]. Our portfolio’s initial 
focus on large-cap stocks as being risk-resistant was a bad one. Fortunately, we did not stick with 
that set of criteria long. 
So if there is plenty of evidence for active managements losses in this climate, what about 
the intended hero of this exercise, the index fund? The simplest statement is this: the fund of 
mentor’s making, the Vanguard Total Stock Market Index, fell by 11.3%. This may be partially 
because the index fund weights its investments by capitalization, having a heavier emphasis on 
bigger funds, which it seems did not weather this downturn well. "Most people never really got 
back into equity investing" after the 2008 meltdown, said Morris Mark, president of investment 
manager Mark Asset Management. "The economy is getting better very slowly, but a lot of 
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roadblocks have emerged [50].”  If one wanted to find a profit in managed funds, only precious 
metals or bear-strategy funds could have sufficed.  
The “risk-free” alternative to this entire stock-picking exercise would have been much 
simpler. On the day of June 7th, we would have purchased 100 28-day Treasury bills. They 
would have carried a 0.1% coupon discount [51], meaning each would be bought for $999.92. 
After 28 days later, we would have made $8 in profit, which would have been about $8,042.29 
more than was actually made. 
The part of the hypothesis that seems most challenged superficially by this set of 
circumstances is the underlying assumption that the stock market as a whole will continue to 
reflect the creation of value by American industry. Despite this down market, this still seems 
true. It is not as if all of these large-cap companies just stopped selling products (regardless of 
the analyst talk of reduced consumer spending); there is still value being created every day. The 
same factors that cause stock prices to fluctuate can cause the entire market to temporarily trend 
in one direction or the other. While this experiment might not be the strongest support for the 
hypothesis, it is certainly not a refutation. The down market does not affect the logic that the best 
way to capture the market return (however bad it might be) is to hold as much of the market as 
possible, and that the market will eventually recover. When it does recover, it is still likely that 
an index fund will be the most reliable to profit from it. It might be best to focus on bond index 
funds for now, however.   
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5.4 Investment Emotions and the Daily Grind 
A key lesson to take away from this experience is that the prudent investor must not 
dwell on the results of one day’s trading.  Many times over the course of the simulation, we were 
either elated or severely dismayed at the performance of one or more of our stocks, only to see 
the opposite result happen by the end of the week.  A case in point is the performance of Apple; 
at the end of week 3, we had made a profit of $1601.74 and we were extraordinarily pleased with 
this result.  Yet, by the end of week 4 not only had we totally lost this profit, but we also had a 
deficit of $749.70.  The moral of the story is that you cannot be encouraged or discouraged by 
the performance of a stock over a limited timeframe.  Due to the level of volatility in the market, 
the value of a particular stock can change drastically throughout the day.  An investor who is 
constantly paying attention to only the instantaneous value of his/her holdings, will likely suffer 
a nervous breakdown from the sheer emotion of seeing share values go up and down incessantly. 
Indeed, investment emotions can also spur action against one’s best interest, or the haphazard 
adoption of new trading methods without careful thought. Key examples here are the changes in 
stock strategy documented throughout this project. These would not have occurred without 
emotional reaction to losses in the stock market driving them. 
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